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SUBJECT: RSO PESHAWAR MEETING WITH POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS
SECURITY MEASURES OF FOREIGN MISSION'S

REF: PESHAWAR 000475

CLASSIFIED BY: David J. Hazarian, Regional Security Officer,
RSO, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

1.(U) On November 19, 2008, Regional Security Officer (RSO) Peshawar attended a meeting which was chaired by the Home Secretary Branch of Government, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Mr. Fayaz TORU to discuss the security measures of Foreign Missions and U.N. Agencies in Peshawar. Present at the meeting were: Provincial Police Officer, NWFP; Commissioner, Peshawar Region; Commandant Frontier Constabulary, NWFP; Deputy Inspector General, NWFP; Chief Capital City Police Officer, NWFP; and members representing security interests for the UN-All Offices in NWFP; ICRC University Town; British Consul; Afghan and Iranian Consulates and RSO Peshawar.

¶2. (SBU) TORU called the meeting to discuss the significant increase of violence in Peshawar over the past week to include: the killing of a USAID contractor, the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, and the attack on a Japanese and a Pakistani journalist. TORU emphasized the ability of militants to strike successfully and repeatedly illustrated their acute surveillance abilities, targeting their objectives and apparent determination to kidnap and/or kill western and foreign targets.

¶3. (SBU) The Chief Capital City Police Officer (CCCPO), NWFP indicated they are increasing operations throughout town and expressed concern that militant elements may stage further attacks throughout Peshawar, specifically in the University Town area in reprisal of these operations. Additionally, the CCCPO indicated they have very diminished resources due to their heightened state of alert and will not be able to continue with the level of support currently being provided.

¶4. (S//NF) The area referenced, University Town, is primarily a residential area approximately 13 kilometers southeast and a roughly 20-minute commute from the Consulate. All 46 Consulate residences and several off-site facilities, to include the consulate's only recreation, TDY lodging and dining facility (Khyber Club) is located in this area. University Town was the area of the attack on the Principal Officer in September and all Consulate personnel must transit the limited number of roadways into and out of the area on a daily and frequent basis, making University Town one of Post's primary security concerns. This was also the area, on November 12, 2008, where a USAID Contractor, working as the Director for Community Housing Foundation (CHF) was shot dead along with his local driver by unknown assailants. These attacks, together with the recent successful kidnappings of the Afghan Consul General and Iranian diplomat in another upscale neighborhood similar to University Town, denoted a clear shift in adversary methods to organize coordinated attacks in areas thought to be "secure."

RSO PESHAWAR ASSESSMENT

5.A. (S//NF) Based on the complexities and volume of recent

attacks throughout Peshawar, RSO assesses local police assets are inadequate to deal with the current security situation. Additional police support is unlikely to materialize, and from all indicators it will diminish in the immediate term as the NWFP's existing security forces continue to be stretched by other demands and operations in support of GOP military actions in the NWFP.

1B. (S//NF) There has been a significant increase in specific threat reporting targeting US personnel and facilities in University Town, the US Consulate itself and movements throughout Peshawar. Multiple reports specify on-going pre-attack surveillance that clearly indicates knowledge of Consulate routes, procedures and facilities/residences. GPRO places high credibility on the reporting and assesses that militants possess the capability and intention to carry out attacks. Additionally, local police also indicate that sustained Pakistani operations along the border have also angered militants who may now conduct more brazen attacks with less concern regarding HN reprisal and collateral damage.

1C. (S//NF) There is strong indication that pre-attack surveillance has been completed against potential targets, allowing attacks to initiate at discretion of the attacker against US personnel, routes, vehicles and facilities. All of these particulars are known to the adversary.

1D. (S//NF) In the wake of the PO attack in September, NWFP police augmented the BG contingent and RSO has been managing a follow/chase car system to increase the level of security afforded Consulate motor pool movements. Consulate/police assets are stretched critically thin in maintaining this initiative. The reduction of personnel and increase in the number of local guard mobile reaction teams (MRTs) have lessened the pressure to a degree but RSO and NWFP police have limited ability to provide adequate, sustained security or conduct operations to disrupt planned or in-process terrorist operations.

NEXT STEPS

16. (S//NF) In the last week, Post has re-located most of the Consulate personnel to Islamabad to reduce the footprint of movements in and out of University Town. As of November 22, 2008, the Consulate's American staffing levels will be as follows: State-seven; USAID-one; ODRP/ Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE)-twelve; and RAO-thirty-five. GRPO and SOCCE provide for their own security infrastructure. The staff who have departed currently reside in Islamabad, a two-hour car ride away. Consideration is being given to visits from these officers back to Peshawar so they can review their ongoing programs and initiate new ones. For the reasons delineated in the above paragraphs, RSO and Post Management will consider these visits on a strict case-by-case basis until personnel, procedural and physical resources improve. RSO will provide separate requests for funding and personnel in an effort to permit post to move forward with these important foreign affairs initiatives.

17. (U) Point of contact for this information is RSO Peshawar, David J. Hazarian

TRACY